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A Challenge to Liberal Education 






ETHICS ON THE HOME PLANET 
 his is the home planet. Views of Earth from space have given us a 
   first approximation of an emerging vision of Earth and the place 
of human life upon it. "Once a photograph of the Earth, taken from 
the outside is available . . . a new idea as powerful as any in history 
will be let loose"1 That idea is one world or none, the unity of the 
home planet, our global responsibility. Leaving home, we discover 
how precious a home is. The distance lends enchantment, brings us 
home again. The distance helps us to get real. We get put in our place. 
We learn who we are and where we are. 
A virtually unanimous experience of the hundred or more astro-
nauts, from many countries and cultures, is the awe experienced at 
the first sight of the whole Earth — its beauty, fertility, smallness in the 
abyss of space, light and warmth under the sun in surrounding dark- 
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ness, and, above all, its vulnerability.2 They are grasped and trans-
formed by an astonishing encounter with Earth as it truly is—in the 
words of Edgar Mitchell, "a sparkling blue-and-white jewel ... laced 
with slowly swirling veils of white ... like a small pearl in a thick sea 
of black mystery."3 The most important spin-off of the space program 
is to leave us earthstruck. 
The home planet is in crisis. The two great marvels of our planet are 
life and mind, both among the rarest things in the universe, unknown 
elsewhere. Life, including human life, is a product of evolutionary nat-
ural history. The human brain and hand produce culture superposed 
on natural systems. Diverse combinations of nature and culture 
worked well enough over many millennia, but no more. Our modern 
cultures threaten the integrity, stability, and beauty of Earth and 
thereby of the culture superposed on Earth. Behind the vision of one 
world is the shadow of none. 
We are searching for an ethics adequate to respect life on this home 
planet. Earth is the only planet in our solar system with an ecology, 
the only planet that is a home; and, on Earth, home to multiple mil-
lions of species, humans are the only species of moral agents. Earth is 
the only planet "right for life," and ethics asks about the "right to life" 
on such a planet. Certainly it seems "right" hat life continue here; life 
is, in the deepest sense, the most valuable phenomenon of all on 
Earth, with its prolific history since the origin of life three and a half 
billion years ago. 
The late-coming, moral species, Homo sapiens, arising a few hun-
dred thousand years ago, has, even more so lately, gained startling 
powers for the rebuilding and modification, including the degrada-
tion, of this home planet. The four most critical issues that humans 
currently face are peace, population, development, and environment. 
All are entwined. Human desires for maximum development drive 
population increase, escalate exploitation of the environment, and 
fuel the forces of war. Those who are not at peace with one another 
find it difficult to be at peace with nature and vice versa. Those who 
exploit persons will typically exploit nature as readily—animals, 
plants, species, ecosystems, and Earth itself. 
An interhuman ethics must serve to find a satisfactory fit for 
humans in their communities, and, beyond that, an environmental 
ethics must serve to find a satisfactory fit for humans in the larger 
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communities of fauna and flora. We worried throughout this century 
that humans would destroy themselves in interhuman conflict; that 
fear has subsided somewhat only to be replaced by a new one. The 
worry for the next century is that humans may destroy their planet 
and themselves with it. If we humans are true to our species epithet, 
"the wise species" needs to behave with appropriate respect for life. 
That will involve an interhuman ethics. Will it also involve an inter-
specific ethics? An Earth ethics? 
Answering this question is a fundamental challenge to the universi-
ties of the world. These universities are part of the problem. They 
have produced the knowledge by which humans have gained their 
startling powers for the rebuilding and the degradation of this home 
planet. The knowledge accumulated in the universities, transmitted 
from one generation to the next, is of great genius. Yet it has destabi-
lized human life on our home planet. Both the sciences and the 
humanities are responsible. Can the universities now help to produce 
the wisdom needed? The answer will not come from universities 
alone, for governments, businesses, primary and secondary schools, 
churches, indeed all the institutions of culture are participants in the 
answer. But universities set the pace intellectually; they educate today 
the leaders of tomorrow who will answer this question. 
So we must face the challenges of environmental ethics, realizing 
how these are challenges to liberal education in the arts and sciences. 
Is the university prepared to meet this challenge? What is the role of 
the university in gaining the vision of one world where humans are in 
harmony with nature? What does the university have to teach about 
nature? What does the university have to learn about nature? To learn 
from nature? To learn and teach about appropriate respect for life on 
this home planet? That is not merely an assignment for the sciences; it 
is a challenge to the humanities. 
"I'm a lover of learning, and trees and country places won't teach 
me anything, whereas people in the city do."4 Socrates loved the city 
with its agora, gymnasia, politics, and culture, but he avoided nature 
as profitless and boring. On the other hand, when John Muir finished 
his formal education and turned to live in the Sierra Nevadas, he 
wrote, "I was only leaving one university for another, The Wisconsin 
University for the University of the Wilderness."5 No education is com-
plete until one has a concept of nature, and no ethics is complete until 
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one has an appropriate respect for fauna, flora, landscapes, and 
ecosystems. Universities love learning; universities love people and 
strive to make and keep life human. But, in an environmental ethics, 
life cannot be made and kept human unless it knows its place, the 
human residence on this home planet. 
Such learning will, in part, expand what we have so far learned, a 
love of nature to complement our love of humans. That is a matter of 
repairing shortcomings in university education. But it will, in equal 
part, require us to unlearn what we thought we had learned. For edu-
cation in the modern world has been designed to further the conquest 
of nature and the industrialization of the planet. Education has sepa-
rated, alienated persons from nature. It has not produced a sustainable 
society. University learning has powered human success—an overde-
velopment in which a good thing turns into a bad thing. We think of 
the universities as being the scene of an explosion of knowledge over 
the decades of this century. We think that knowledge is power. But if 
this explosion of knowledge and its resulting empowerment has pro-
duced a planet in crisis, perhaps the genius of the university is not 
what we thought. Our knowledge has not made us better fitted for life 
on the planet; it has made us misfits—so misfitted that our survival is at 
stake. If so, we need a new vision of responsibility. 
RIGHTS AND CULTURE 
Universities defend the humanum, the values carried by the human 
genius, those characteristics that make for human excellence, the arts 
and sciences by which humans are distinguished from the animal 
world. Universities transmit the heritage of culture, without which 
we cannot be human. They teach humans the art of living well; the 
sciences by which we understand the world. Animals have neither 
arts nor sciences; the particular virtue of Homo sapiens, the wise 
species, is this transmissible knowledge, this wisdom by which 
human life continues and flourishes. Universities guard our humanity. 
So it can first be thought that the role of the university is to protect 
human values at stake in the crisis on the home planet. What better 
way is there to do this than to speak out for human integrity and dig-
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what is right for humans, what is the human right? So perhaps the way 
to an Earth ethics is to defend human rights? 
Ethics in the West developed long before modern biology, and even 
afterward has remained relatively autonomous, owing to a conviction 
that one commits the "naturalistic fallacy" to try to derive ethics from 
biology. Such humanistic ethics has recently come to place much 
weight on "rights." Since its origin in the mists of the past, ethics has 
meant choosing "right" against wrong. But "rights." a plural noun, is a 
recent way of conceptualizing certain human values. We protect 
those values by calling them "rights," privileges and possessions of 
humans in culture, which it is not "right" to be deprived of. Rights is a 
way of celebrating and guarding what is essentially human. But, in the 
very separation of ethics from biology, we shall have to wonder 
whether rights, celebrating the human, can help us to treasure the 
natural. 
Such "rights" belong mostly in the heritage of Western culture; the 
idea is not well developed in ancient, preliterate, or Oriental cultures. 
There is nothing about rights in the Bible or in Plato and Aristotle. 
Still, "rights" has been an important Western ethical discovery, or 
invention. The universities have been champions of human rights. 
Such rights typically involve some human good at slake owing to the 
behavior of other humans. Rights can vary in kind; some are inalien-
able, at the core of human well-being; some can be bought and sold; 
some can be forfeited by wrong behavior; some cannot. Some are 
legal rights: privileges and possessions that persons have by virtue of 
their citizenship, and, where denied, these can be claimed by due 
process of law. Some are moral rights: claims made about goods uni-
versal to human persons, regardless of their citizenship. A citizen has 
a legal right to vote. Innocent persons have a right not to be killed, no 
matter whether they have court access. By moral and often legal right, 
persons have a right to an education, sufficiently at least to be func-
tional in their societies. 
Moral rights are sometimes said to be "natural" rights—not that 
they can be discovered by studying nature from a scientific point of 
view but that they arise from the character of human nature. They lie 
at the root of our well-being. They are not conventional by action of 
legislature or law court; they are intrinsic to the nature of person- 
hood. Moral rights are the basis of what legal rights ought to be; and 
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we often appeal to moral rights where legal rights fall short, for 
instance where national sovereignties violate human rights or where 
there are no national sovereignties. 
"Rights" protect certain human values thought especially impor-
tant. Some of these we enjoy by way of culture, others by nature. 
"Rights" issues arise when such values need to be protected against 
the incursions of other humans. Everything human occurs, as 
Catherine Larrère (this volume) reminds us, in the cultural environ- 
ment of humans interrelating with other humans. "Man is by nature a 
political animal," said Aristotle—the animal who builds and inhabits a 
"polis," a city.6 Man is genetically an animal but specifically a citizen; 
that is the differentia that identifies the human essence. Hence we 
expect that ethics will arise to govern conduct in the "polis," channel-
ing, orienting behavior to protect the goods of human nature and cul-
ture. We expect the universities to be at the front of such effort. What 
the universities will do is produce cultured citizens, who respect each 
other's rights, and where this happens, there will be harmony 
between persons. But will there be, by these rights, harmony 
between people and nature? 
HUMAN RIGHTS TO NATURE 
Asking about human rights, we can readily say that humans have a 
"right" to an environment that is healthy, that has its integrity. Such a 
right has not figured in the heritage of our past; there will be little 
written about it in the great university libraries of the world. 
Nevertheless, the academy can now speak out for this human right. 
For, evidently, humans are helped or hurt by the condition of their 
environment, and if humans have a right to life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness, then they have a right to the natural conditions that 
are necessary to produce it. This includes the basic natural givens— 
air, soil, water, functioning ecosystems, hydrologic cycles, and so on. 
It may also include the environmental amenities—wildlife and wild- 
flowers, scenic views, access to natural areas—since well-being 
includes amenities as well as essential natural resources. Such a "right 
to nature" is a right within culture, that is, it is a claim we can make 
against intrusions made by other humans where these put a healthy 
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environment in jeopardy Aggregating these claims at the global level, 
we might say that we humans have a right to this home planet. 
We have discovered of late there is one more domain where 
humans have fundamental values at stake, always present but only 
recently consciously appreciated, a domain so threatened that it must 
come under political protection. The 1948 text of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing on the natural envi-
ronment.7 The 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, in 
Stockholm, sought to delineate the "rights* of the human family to a 
healthy and productive environment. The World Commission on 
Environment and Development has declared that "All human beings 
have the fundamental right to an environment adequate for their 
health and well-being."8 The United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, through its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, has under way a study on human rights 
and their application to environmental problems. In nations revising 
their constitutions, the right to nature ought to be a constitutional 
right. The universities of the world by their research and advocacy 
can facilitate this process. 
We must notice, anticipating the analysis to follow, that this does 
not mean that humans have some kind of claim against Mother 
Nature, for nature is no moral agent. We cannot lay claims against 
nature, any more than we can against grizzly bears or wildflowers, 
rivers or mountains. There is no right to be claimed against nature for 
these processes and products. Nature is prolific but not responsible. 
In fact, if we leave the humanum and turn to nature, to nature as it is 
independently of the human presence, what then? Such a nature pre-
ceded and yet surrounds us; it is also our human environment. But 
there things change—dramatically. 
RIGHTS AND NATURE 
What follows is a series of anomalies that cumulatively build toward a 
paradigm overthrow. The first anomaly occurs when we ask about our 
responsibilities for animal life and try to extend the concept of rights 
to animals. The concept that has worked so well to enlighten us about 
human dignity in the West fails to enlighten us about our duties to the 
fauna. Continuing the anomalies, we shall find that our intellectual 
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and moral education in the West ill equips us to value the flora, or 
species, or ecosystems, or to rise to an Earth ethics. We shall find that 
our political orders tend to fragment rather than unify us for a global 
environmental ethics. The challenge to contemporary education is 
competent evaluation of the natural world. 
Consider, first, rights in nature. Although we humans may have a 
right to the natural environment, in that natural environment there 
are no rights at all, because in wild nature there is no humanum. 
There were no rights over the millennia of evolutionary time—nor are 
there today, outside the human sector. In the wilderness the mountain 
lion is not violating the rights of the deer he slays. Even the lioness 
who eats a human is not guilty of reprehensible behavior, for which 
she can be brought into court. The mountain lion can establish no 
relationships outside wild nature. Meanwhile, human beings do have 
a right to be protected from mountain lion predation and rescued 
when attacked, in their relationships to other humans. Rights go with 
legitimate claims and entitlements; but there are no titles or laws that 
can be transgressed in the wild. Rights go with appeals to moral 
agents who ought to protect certain human values. Nature is amoral, 
though perhaps valuable. 
Wildflowers do not have rights nor can they recognize the rights of 
others. They do not have responsibilities. Nor do rivers and canyons, 
clouds and mountains. All this is comedy, because in nature the con-
cept of rights is an inappropriate category. Aldo Leopold did say, "The 
land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to 
include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land. ...  
A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, management, 
and use of these 'resources,' but it does affirm their right to continued 
existence, and, at least in spots, their continued existence in a natural 
state." They "should continue as a matter of biotic right."9 But he is 
pleading for an appropriate human behavior, he does not mean that 
rights is a matter of their biology. He is groping to claim that their bio-
logical existence confronts humans with a value that it is not right for 
humans always to destroy. We have frankly to face the fact that there 
are no rights in nature.  Perhaps they are generated when 
humans arrive and confront biotic nature. 
We are beginning to see the challenge of environmental ethics to 
liberal education. There is a dramatic change when one moves from 
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the university to wild nature. At the university everything is human; 
everything is humane. In wild nature nothing is human, nor humane. 
The university defends human rights, but in the processes of nature 
there are no rights at all. 
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND WELFARE 
Or are there? Perhaps we are too quick to limit rights to those kinds of 
beings who can be schooled in culture. Perhaps animals have rights 
and the university can defend these? Charles 3. Elton, an ecologist, 
reports a belief that he himself shares, "There are millions of people in 
the world who think that animals have a right to exist and be left 
alone."10 Arne Naess, a philosopher, says of animals that "in principle 
each of them have the same right to live and blossom as we and our 
children have.11 In the United States over the last two decades, for 
instance, there is hardly a university that has not instituted an animal 
welfare committee, screening the uses of animals that the university 
permits. There is hardly a university on the campus of which there 
have not been protests and demonstrations against uses of animals. 
There is hardly a university that has not introduced a vegetarian alter-
native into its food services. Perhaps what we have now to learn is 
that the rights of humans is not all that the universities have to defend; 
they have to defend the rights of animals. 
But whether or not animals have rights that we ought to defend is a 
challenging question. We still have under debate an appropriate ethic 
for animals, even though there is widespread conviction that many of 
our uses of animals have been immoral. The problem with animal 
"rights" is that, if we try to apply it to all the ranges of animal life, the 
concept grows tenuous. What happens is similar to the degeneration 
of other concepts that work well at the human level and fade over a 
descending phylogenetic spectrum—what it means to be "conscious" 
or "aware," to "deliberate," to undergo "experience," to have "inter-
ests" and "needs," even what it means to "suffer." 
We speak with some plausibility of the "mammal rights" of chim-
panzees and dolphins but with difficulty of those of birds or of snakes 
and perhaps not at all of any in oysters and insects. Moving down the 
spectrum (the species) of animal being, the concept of rights trans-
lates from human affairs to human-animal relations less and less well. 
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We begin to ask whether this is a logical difficulty, a matter of cultural 
conditioning, a habit of language? Or does it reflect attenuating value 
in organisms? A connection of rights with human-allied kinds of expe-
rience? These are challenging questions, on which we need help, and 
what can we learn from the philosophers, the ethicists, the etholo- 
gists, the zoologists? What disciplines of the university can help us to 
answer the question of appropriate respect for animal welfare? 
Perhaps we should not arbitrarily restrict rights to persons? Still, 
animal rights are not natural in the sense that they exist in sponta-
neous nature. There is nothing about animal rights in zoology text-
books. Meanwhile, by constructing the concepts of rights, Western 
ethicists discover a way to protect values naturally present in persons. 
University faculty of every discipline will, each and every one, cham-
pion human rights, zoologists as quickly as philosophers. So rights 
seem to be there when (Western?) persons come on the scene and 
gone when persons are gone. But animal rights? Perhaps rights are 
generated by the encounter of moral agents with sentient life? So 
rights, clearly present in (or assigned to) persons, should also be 
found (or assigned) when persons encounter higher sentient animals. 
But such rights would only be seminatural, not natural in the sense 
that they exist in wild nature; they would be cultural products. Such 
rights would emerge only when humans intervene in ecosystems. 
Such an intervention-generated right would be stronger than a legal 
right, binding independently of law, but not natural. Humans must 
sometimes affect sentient life adversely, they may sometimes affect it 
beneficially, and when we do either, we might say that some animals 
gain a right, otherwise unknown in nature, to flourish in their own 
way. There would be no rights for animals in wild nature; but animals 
in pens in laboratories on university campuses would have rights, 
rights that arise because they are in encounter with researchers. 
Or is there a better way to conceive of the value of animal life than to 
use the vocabulary of rights? To say, "X has rights" seems like a state-
ment of fact. But it is really a valuation, embedding a prescription, 
claiming to have located value in the possessor of rights. There are no 
rights present in the wild before humans arrive. But values—interests, 
desires, needs satisfied, a welfare at stake—are there apart from the 
human presence. It is really more "natural" to say that animals have 
goods (or, more technically, utilities). Goods do exist in wild nature, 
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while rights do not. The goods of sentient animals are best examined 
with a concept of health, or interests satisfied, or welfare. 
But if that is so, perhaps what we realty want is a vocabulary of 
value. Animals enjoy values intrinsic to themselves, and, when 
humans arrive, appropriate respect for those values generates an 
ethics. "Rights" is a noun and can look like the name for something 
that an animal or a human has, in addition to hair, teeth, skills.  But 
there is no reference to anything biologically present; a right is more 
like a person's having "money" or "status," that is, these things are sub-
jectively, sociologically real, used to protect values that are insepara- 
bly entwined with personality. We might try to stretch such rights and 
project them out of culture onto wild nature. But this does not work 
convincingly if we move far from analogical contests. The concept 
breaks down because nature is not culture. 
By contrast, "right" is an adjective, used to name forms of behavior 
engaged in by moral agents. All that "rights" (the noun) really does is 
state some of the claims about "right" behavior. Environmental ethics 
uses "rights" more as a term of convenience; the real convictions here 
are about what is "right." The issues soon revert to evaluations of right 
behavior, and we are better advised to dispense with the noun, rights, 
since this is not something that attaches to animals in the wild. We 
should use only the adjective, right, arising when moral agents 
encounter nature and find something valuable there. The ethics arises 
when the moral agent arrives, but the value was there before. It is 
sometimes convenient rhetorically but in principle unnecessary to use 
the concept of rights at all. 
PLANTS AND NATURAL VALUE 
But it is not simply animals on campus, animals used in culture, or 
even animals in the wild that we arc concerned about. Even if we find 
an account of moral obligation for animal welfare, taking care of that 
anomaly, most of the natural environment still remains unaccounted 
for. Taking a cue from the protecting of values, rather than the pro-
tecting of rights, we need to ask about larger responsibilities for pro-
tecting natural values. We are answerable for the values that we 
ourselves may threaten. Also, our responsibilities can tell us what we 
do not have a right to do. 
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In environmental ethics, moral agents confront valuable nonhu- 
mans who have neither moral rights nor moral responsibilities. But 
we humans do have responsibilities in encounter with these natural 
values, because one ought to respect value wherever it is found, 
including value at levels of being that are not human and therefore 
incapable of carrying either rights or responsibilities. 
At this point, however, the universities, which we before found 
troubled by the question whether animals have rights, are even more 
troubled about whether there can be values in a wider class of nonhu- 
man beings. No one doubts, of course, that the animals and plants, the 
rivers and forests, can be valuable resources for human life. Nature 
can be instrumentally valuable. My university, for instance, has an 
entire "College of Natural Resources," and almost all of the funding for 
natural science is given with a view to the beneficial applications that 
may result from such university research. The university champions 
the liberal arts and sciences, because the sciences liberate us as much 
as do the arts. They give us knowledge (epistêmê) and technical skills 
(technê) by which we can have dominion over nature. 
But whether nature has instrumental value is not the question chal-
lenging us here. The question is whether natural kinds have a good of 
their own. The university has not found this question easy to answer. 
The phytophyla certainly do not manifest the values that the univer-
sity prizes: they do not reason, they do not argue, they have no self- 
conscious reflection, nor are they autonomous selves. They cannot be 
educated. They are not even sentient; so what is of value in dumb 
plants? 
In fact, there is a considerable presumption at least in the universi-
ties of the modern, scientific West, that all of nature is value-free. 
Take, for example, the conclusion of William James, eminent Harvard 
philosopher, who, early in our century, set the orientation that has 
characterized so much of the twentieth century. In an influential and 
representative statement, James portrays an utterly valueless world, 
with value appearing only when humans arrive: 
Conceive yourself, if possible, suddenly stripped of all the emo-
tion with which your world now inspires you, and try to imagine 
it as it exists, purely by itself, without your favorable or unfavor-
able, hopeful or apprehensive comment. It will be almost impos-
sible for you to realize such a condition of negativity and 
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deadness. No one portion of the universe would then have 
importance beyond another; and the whole collection of its 
things and series of its events would be without significance, 
character, expression, or perspective. Whatever of value, inter-
est, or meaning our respective worlds may appear imbued with 
are thus pure gifts of the spectator's mind.12 
The universe is without value, except as humans come on the 
scene? That is a legacy that the universities have to overcome; and 
overcoming it requires a paradigm change about value. An insensate 
organism has no value on its own? Despite Socrates' dislike of trees, 
philosophers once knew better. But modern philosophers have for-
gotten what their classical predecessors knew. And what the philoso-
phers forgot, the botanists should have been able to rediscover for 
them. Although we shall find nothing about biotic rights in botany 
textbooks, we shall find a great deal about survival value. Plants 
defend their lives; much is valuable to them for their survival. 
A plant is not a valuer with preferences that can be satisfied or frus-
trated. It seems odd to claim that plants need our sympathy, odd to ask 
that we should consider their point of view. They have no subjective 
life, only objective life. But, though nothing matters to a tree, much is 
vital. An organism is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, sustain-
ing and reproducing itself, executing its program, checking perfor-
mance by means of responsive capacities with which to measure 
success. Plants are unified entities of the botanical, though not of the 
zoological, kind. That is, they are not unitary organisms highly inte-
grated with centered neural control, but they are modular organisms, 
with a meristem that can repeatedly and indefinitely produce new 
vegetative modules, additional stem nodes and leaves when there is 
available space and resources, as well as new reproductive modules— 
fruits and seeds—that contain the DMA coding to organize more of 
their kind. 
A botanical organism is partly a special kind of cause and effect sys-
tem and partly something more: a historical information system with a 
genetic coding that enables it to cope, to make a way through the 
world. In this sense, the genome is a set of conservation molecules. 
Given a chance, these molecules seek organic self-expression. With 
this a plant, unlike an inert rock, claims the environment as source 
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and sink, from which to abstract energy and materials and into which 
to excrete them. An acorn becomes an oak; the oak stands on its own. 
So far we have only botanical description. We pass to philosophical 
value when we recognize that the genetic set is a normative set; it dis-
tinguishes between what is and what ought to be. This does not mean 
that the organism is a moral system. But the organism is an axiologi- 
cal, evaluative system. So the oak grows, reproduces, repairs its 
wounds, and resists death. The physical state that the organism seeks, 
idealized in its programmatic form, is a valued state. Value is present 
in this achievement. 'Vital' seems a better word for it than 'biological'. 
A life is defended for what it is in itself. Every organism has a 
good-of-its-kind; it defends its own kind as a good kind. 
When humans encounter a living organism, they become responsi-
ble for their behavior. A moral agent, deciding his or her behavior, 
ought to take account of the consequences for other evaluative sys-
tems. We do have a responsibility to protect values, where they are 
present and at jeopardy by our behavior. Of course, given our own 
biological needs, humans must eat. Humans too have to make a way 
through the world, and this requires capturing values present in other 
organisms. We do so not only as biological agents but as moral agents. 
We have, if you like, a right to eat; but we have a responsibility to 
respect the vitalities of the organisms around us. 
Meanwhile, the whole question of value in the natural world 
requires an unprecedented mixing of biology and philosophy, of sci-
ence and conscience, a mixing that the university disciplines, espe-
cially in the light of the legacy of a value-free nature, are not yet well 
prepared to undertake. 
ENDANGERED SPECIES 
At the species level, responsibilities increase. So does the intellectual 
challenge of defending duties to species. The problem is partly scien-
tific, one to be answered by the biologists. What are species? The 
problem is partly ethical, one to be answered by the philosophers. 
What duties have we to species? 
Scientists find it difficult to say what a species is. They often incline 
to say that a species is merely an arbitrary classification, like the lines 
of latitude and longitude. Darwin, the father of modern biology, 
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wrote, "I look at the term 'species,' as one arbitrarily given for the sake 
of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each other."13 
When A. J. Shaw recently "discovered" a new species of moss, Pohlia 
tundrae, in the alpine Rocky Mountains, he did not find any hitherto 
unknown plants, he just regrouped herbarium material in the cabi-
nets of the university herbaria that had been known for decades 
under other names.14 Indeed, biologists routinely put after a species 
the name of the "author" who, they say, "erected" the taxon. So it can 
sound like species are just decisions made by systematists at the uni-
versities, who make them up this way or that. If so, there can hardly 
be a duty to endangered species. 
Fortunately, other biologists have a better and more plausible 
answer. G. G. Simpson of Yale University, among the best paleontolo-
gists of the century, concludes: "An evolutionary species is a lineage 
(an ancestral-descendant sequence of populations) evolving sepa-
rately from others and with its own unitary evolutionary role and ten-
dencies."15 Ernst Mayr, of Harvard University, holds that "species are 
groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively 
isolated from other such groups." He can even emphasize that 
"species are the real units of evolution, they are the entities which 
specialize, which become adapted, or which shift their adaptation."16 
Niles Eldredge and Joel Cracraft find that "A species is a diagnosable 
cluster of individuals within which there is a parental pattern of 
ancestry and descent, beyond which there is not, and which exhibits 
a pattern of phylogenetic ancestry and descent among units of like 
kind." Species, they insist, are "discrete entities in time as well as 
space."17 The claim that there are specific forms of life historically 
maintained in their environments over time does not seem arbitrary 
or fictitious at all but, rather, as certain as anything else we believe 
about the empirical world, even though at times scientists revise the 
theories and taxa with which they map these forms. 
So, in answer to the question, What are species?, we may at least 
confidently answer, Species exist; they are as real as individual plants 
or animals. Species are specific forms of life historically maintained in 
their environments over time. The individual represents—re-pre-
sents—a species in each new generation. It is a token of a type, and 
the type is more important than the token. Now the philosophers can 
begin to answer their question, What duties can there be to species? A 
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species lacks moral agency, reflective self-awareness, sentience, or 
organic individuality. A species has no self. But there is a biological 
identity reasserted genetically over time. The life that the individual 
has is something passing through the individual as much as something 
it intrinsically possesses, and a respect for life finds it appropriate to 
attach duty dynamically to the specific form of life. 
The species line is the dynamic living system, the whole, of which 
individual organisms are the essential parts. The species too has its 
integrity, its individuality, its "right to life" (if we must use the rhetoric 
of rights); and it is more important to protect this vitality than to pro-
tect individual integrity. The right to life, biologically speaking, is an 
adaptive fit that is right for life, that survives over millennia, and this 
generates at least a presumption that species are good and therefore 
that it is right for humans to let them be, to let them evolve. The 
appropriate survival unit is the appropriate level of moral concern. 
A shutdown of the life stream on Earth is the most destructive event 
possible. The wrong that humans are doing, or allowing to happen 
through carelessness, is stopping the historical vitality of life. Every 
extinction is an incremental decay in this stopping of life, no small 
thing. "Ought species X to exist?" is a distributive increment in the 
collective question, "Ought life on Earth to exist?" Since life on Earth 
is an aggregate of many species, when humans jeopardize species the 
burden of proof lies with those who wish deliberately to extinguish a 
species and simultaneously to care for life on Earth. One form of life 
has never endangered so many others. Never before has this level of 
question been deliberately faced. Humans have more understanding 
than ever of the natural world they inhabit, of the speciating 
processes, more predictive power to foresee the intended and unin-
tended results of their actions, and more power to reverse the unde-
sirable consequences. Such knowledge has come from universities. 
Can the universities also provide the wisdom needed to accompany 
such power and knowledge? At this point, all biology ought to 
become conservation biology, committed to optimizing the values 
carried by species. The responsibilities that such power and vision 
generate no longer attach simply to individuals or persons but are 
emerging duties to specific forms of life. What is required is princi-
pled responsibility to the biospheric Earth. 
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Educating such responsibility in the next generation is the role of 
the universities, although, few universities have ever raised the ques-
tion of duties to species, much less answered it. But now such duty is 
becoming clearer. Indeed it is urgent. If, in this world of uncertain 
moral convictions, it makes any sense to claim that one ought not to 
kill individuals, without justification, it makes more sense to claim 
that one ought not to kill the species, without extraordinary justifica-
tion. Several billion years worth of creative toil, many millions of 
species of teeming life, have been handed over to the care of this 
late-coming species in which mind has flowered and morals have 
emerged. Life on Earth is a many splendored thing; extinction dims its 
luster. From here onward, no one can claim to be educated, unless he 
or she knows that and acts accordingly. 
ECOSYSTEMS AND A LAND ETHIC 
We have been traveling into progressively less familiar ethical terrain, 
starting with humans, to whom humans have familiar duties, whose 
rights we indisputably must protect, and moving to consider higher 
animals, lower animal and plant organisms, and species. Duties to 
species began to open out toward duties to the speciating process and 
the supporting ecosystem in which species live and move and have 
their being. This includes Homo sapiens who, though a cultural ani-
mal, also lives in ecosystems. Ecosystems are ultimately our home, 
from which 'ecology' is derived (Greek: oikos, house). We need a logic 
and ethic for Earth with its family of fife. Can universities help to form 
this deeper ethic? Can they help us to value ecosystem communities 
both as our home and intrinsically— for what they are in themselves? 
   Environmental ethics claims that with ecosystems responsibilities 
continue to rise. "A thing is right," urged Aldo Leopold, "when it tends 
to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic commu-
nity; it is wrong when it tends otherwise."18 But ecosystems are unfa-
miliar moral territory. It is difficult to get the biology right and, 
superimposed on the biology, difficult to get the ethics right. 
Fortunately, that human welfare depends on ecosystemic support is , 
often evident. All our legislation about clean air, clean water, soil con-
servation, national and state forest policy, pollution controls, renew-
able resources, and so forth is concerned about ecosystem-level 
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processes. Further, humans find much of value in preserving wild 
ecosystems, for instance in our wilderness and park systems and our 
biological reserves. Still, a comprehensive environmental ethics 
needs the best naturalistic reasons, as well as the good humanistic 
ones, for respecting ecosystems. 
As with species before, we have here a scientific question mixed 
with an ethical one. What are ecosystems? Only after answering that 
question can we ask whether there is value there, whether humans 
can have duties to ecosystems. An answer requires a seminal mix of 
biology and ethics, an understanding of what ecosystems are as well 
as a judgment that humans ought to preserve them. We need an accu-
rate description of ecosystems and an informed prescription for con-
duct. We have to make clear, both in science and in ethics, a paradigm 
of community. Ecology discovers what is taking place in ecosystems, 
what biotic community means. Crossing over from science to ethics, 
we can discover the values in such community-systems and our 
human duties toward them. 
Ecologists have themselves had differing opinions about ecosys-
tems. "The plant formation is an organic unit . . .  a complex organ-
ism."19 So Frederic Clements, a founder of ecology, concluded from his 
studies of plant associations in the Nebraska grasslands. But Henry 
Gleason, a botanist of equal rank, protested, "Far from being an organ-
ism, an association is merely the fortuitous juxtaposition of plants."20 
On the one view, an ecosystem is rather like an organism; on the 
other, an ecosystem is only an accidental association of plants—little 
more than stochastic processes. A seashore, a tundra is a loose collec-
tion of externally related parts, hardly a community. It can begin to 
seem as if concern for ecosystems is secondary, instrumental to a 
respect for human and nonhuman life. An ecosystem is too low a level 
of organization to be the direct focus of concern. Or perhaps there is 
some other concept of biotic community—some sort of real natural 
unit, a level of organization above its individual member organisms. 
What description is plausible? Do prescriptions follow? 
The debate among the biologists has, understandably, confused the 
philosophers. For there can be no obligations to an accidental jumble 
of organisms. That would be even more absurd than duties to species 
as arbitrary conventions. John Passmore, a philosopher entering the 
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argument, thinks that only paradigmatic human communities gener-
ate obligations: 
Ecologically, no doubt, men do form a community with plants, 
animals, soil, in the sense that a particular life-cycle will involve 
all four of them. But if it is essential to a community that the mem-
bers of it have common interests and recognize mutual obliga-
tions, then men, plants, animals, and soil do not form a 
community. Bacteria and men do not recognize mutual obliga-
tions, nor do they have common interests. In the only sense in 
which belonging to a community generates ethical obligations, 
they do not belong to the same community.21 
Passmore is assuming that the members of a morally bound commu-
nity must recognize reciprocal obligations. If the only communal 
belonging that generates obligations is this social sense, involving 
mutual recognition of interests, then the human community is the 
sole matrix of morality, and the case is closed. Donald H. Regan, 
another philosopher, agrees: "Community—in the only sense in 
which it can possibly have any moral significance—requires at least 
the potential for shared beliefs and values. The universe of living crea-
tures simply does not amount to a community in any morally relevant 
sense."22 
So unless we can find a revised concept of biotic community and a 
revised concept of what duties can be toward, there will be no duties 
to ecosystems. Ecosystems are one of the great discoveries of our cen-
tury, not so much by scientists working in university laboratories as by 
scientists working out of doors. Much biology has been pursued 
under the microscope, and we arc justly proud of the discoveries of 
molecular biology. But we cannot forget that all the microscopic 
structures, the DNA coding, the proteins with the structures and func-
tions, are all for the sake of coping in the big scale ecosystemic world. 
Life takes place as organisms move through their worlds, inhabiting a 
niche in an ecosystem, as surely as it does in the cellular organelles 
and their biochemistries. 
A gene is always emplaced in an organism that is emplaced in an 
ecosystem. The molecular configurations of DNA are what they are 
because they record the story of a particular form of life in the macro-
scopic, historical ecosystem. What is generated arises from molecular 
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mutations, but what survives is selected for adaptive fit in an ecosys-
tem. We cannot make sense of molecular life without understanding 
ecosystemic life. The one level is as vital as the other. 
Are ecosystems real? Yes. As real as Earth itself. Those who hold 
that organisms, or their biochemical molecules, are real, while ecosys-
tems are just collections of interacting individuals, epiphenomenal 
aggregations, have fallen into confusion. Any level is real if there is sig-
nificant downward causation. Thus the cell is real because that pat-
tern shapes the behavior of amino acids, the organism is real because 
that pattern coordinates the behavior of hearts and lungs, and the 
ecosystem is real because the niche shapes the morphology and 
behavior of the members and parts within it. In that sense, ecosys-
tems are as real as cells. For that conviction we are indebted to the 
great university ecologists of the twentieth century. 
Still, their reality gives us grounds to ask whether ecosystems gen-
erate duties; it does not, by itself provide an answer. Unlike higher ani-
mals, ecosystems have no experiences; they do not and cannot care. 
Unlike plants, ecosystems have no genome. Unlike species, ecosys-
tems have no ongoing organismic identity reinstantiated over time. 
Ecosystems can even sometimes seem to be jungles where the fittest 
survive, places of contest and conflict, or haphazard juxtaposition. 
But ecosystems are productive, vital systems. They produce and sup-
port, but they also limit, each kind—locking it into the welfare of oth-
ers. Species increase their kind; but ecosystems have increased kinds, 
generated ever-richer communities. Hence the evolutionary toil, elab-
orating and diversifying the biota, that once began with zero species 
and results today in many millions of species—from protozoans to 
pupfish to people. 
Biologists describe ecosystems as objectively interdependent com-
munities where organismic needs are sufficiently satisfied for species 
long to survive, and philosophers ought to find that such ecosystems 
are satisfactory communities to which to attach duty. Our concern 
must be for the fundamental unit of survival. Ecosystems are the 
womb of life, the home community. They select for adaptive fit, they 
have generated over evolutionary time increasingly richer lives in 
quality and quantity, and continue now to support myriads of species 
and individuals, with higher levels of autonomy and experience at the 
top trophic levels. Human cultures emerge from Earth's ecosystems 
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and remain tethered to them. If such biotic communities are not 
admirable, satisfactory, and morally considerable, why not? 
Ethical conservatives, in the humanist sense, will say that ecosys-
tems are of value only because they contribute to human experiences. 
But that mistakes the last chapter for the whole story, one fruit for the 
whole plant. Humans count enough to have the right to flourish on 
Earth, but not so much that they have the right to degrade or shut 
down ecosystems, not at least without a burden of proof that there is 
an overriding cultural gain. The really conservative, radical view sees 
that the integrity, stability, and beauty of biotic communities is what is 
most fundamentally to be conserved. We are beginning to see that 
universities today are challenged to defend values that are much more 
comprehensive than simply the classical values of the academy. 
A POLITICALLY FRAGMENTED EARTH 
The challenges so far have asked whether universities are up to the 
task of defending value in the natural world. Have they an adequate 
concept of what sentient animals are and what duties are owed them, 
of what insentient organisms are and what baseline organismic values 
are to be protected? Can they make clear what a species is, what 
ecosystems are, and whether and why there are duties to such supra- 
organismic biological entities? Those assignments are all about the 
concept of nature. I now want to turn to an equally serious challenge 
facing universities, one in the cultural arena. 
Superimposed on this morally deep world—with its fauna and 
flora, each reproducing after its kind, interacting in ecosystems, and 
with its planetary wholeness—is the world of human culture, the 
"polis." Alas, this is a politically fragmented world. There is one Earth, 
on it are 170 sovereign nations. The Brundtland Report begins, "The 
Earth is one but the world is not."23 True, the one Earth is plural in its 
land masses and supports myriads of ecosystems, diverse species, 
diverse peoples. Still, the national sovereignties are not well adapted 
for harmonious relations with the Earth commons. The "rights" of 
nations and "rights" as claimed by citizens of these political states are 
not well aligned with the ecology and geography of the planet. In this 
century, the commons problem has become transnational; at the turn 
of the millennium it is becoming critical at global levels.
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The challenge facing the world's universities thus is to criticize 
those dimensions of culture that fragment our harmony with nature, 
to envision alternative forms of culture that make possible the conser-
vation of nature and the diverse social values that result from such 
conservation. Consider the problems of natural resources conceived 
of as national resources. Nationalizing natural resources may be part 
of the solution; it is equally part of the problem. 
Many of Earth's natural resources, unevenly and inequitably distrib-
uted, have to flow across national boundaries if there is to be a stable 
community of nations. Consider the nations in relation to the hydrol-
ogy of the planet. At least 214 river basins are multinational. About 
fifty countries have 75 percent or more of their total area falling 
within international river basins. An estimated 35 to 40 percent of the 
global population lives in multinational river basins. In Africa and 
Europe most river basins are multinational. The word "rival" comes 
from the Latin word for river, rivus, those who share flowing waters, 
With escalating population and pollution levels, sharing water has 
become increasingly an international issue. Nor is it any longer a mat- 
ter of looking upstream and downstream. Shared water includes acid 
rain in Europe and North America. The pollutants produced in one 
nation often fall on—or flow into—another. 
Flowing water is one of the unique features of this home planet, as 
the clouds and seas so evident in the space photographs reveal. The 
flow of water is a cultural resource that, however much modified by 
pipelines and pumps, remains inseparably part of natural meteorolog-
ical and hydrological systems. Water is the most valuable natural 
resource on the planet; in contrast to the other planets, devoid of 
flowing water, water is what makes Earth the womb of life. Water is 
the principal resource that makes Earth right for life. When humans 
arrive, there arise "water rights," but these water rights ought not to 
be exercised in politically fragmented jurisdictions, unintelligently 
related to the hydrology of the landscape. We may buy and sell "water 
rights," but we must also use water in responsible harmony with nat-
ural systems. With water, one has to be a resident of Earth, not just a 
citizen in a city. 
The shapes of the continents are the result of natural forces, and 
natural resources lie where they lie by nature. On these continents, 
national boundaries were drawn for political reasons and often with 
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minimal attention to natural resources. Nearly all these boundaries 
were drawn before many of the modern essential resources were 
resources at all—coal, uranium, copper, or aluminum ore, for exam-
ple. Perhaps the single most valuable marketable natural resource is 
oil. But petroleum on Earth is highly concentrated; one quarter of the 
known reserves are in Saudi Arabia and more than half in the Middle 
East. The need for petroleum, however, is dispersed over nations 
around the globe. We might say that people have a right to petroleum; 
it is difficult nowadays to be either productive or free without it. But 
the divisions of nation-states, accidentally related to the location of 
this highly valuable natural resource, only compound the problem. 
Modern nations—England or Japan, for instance—often have 
economies that require imports of natural resources and exports of 
manufactured goods. Indeed few, if any, nations are self-sufficient in 
all of the natural resources that they need or desire, and many are 
quite deficient. Wars result. People are fighting over what they think 
they have a right to; they are fighting as citizens of nations that have 
economic policies and political agendas. They want resources, but 
the political alignments can often mean suboptinial and unjust 
resource distributions. 
In an Earth ethics that provides for a shared commons, the interna-
tional fabric will have to be stable and dynamic enough so a nation 
that is not self-contained can contain itself within the network of 
international commerce. This involves living in a tension within a 
community of nations where there is access that redistributes 
resources across national lines sufficiently for nations to repair their 
own resource deficiencies in international trade. Unless such com-
merce can be arranged, the environment will suffer. Human rights to a 
decent environment, to their share of the world's resources and 
goods, will be denied. We are still looking for an ethic by which the 
global commons can be fairly shared in ways that make ecological 
sense. When nation-states arc politically operated as if geography and 
ecology were irrelevant, these will be disaster for both nations and 
nature. Such nations are essentially misfits on their landscapes. 
A huge number of people are undernourished. People have a right 
to adequate food. Yet it is a recurrent pattern that, in the midst of star-
vation, there is food available either in the area hit, in neighboring ter-
ritories, or in the global community at large. But for political or 
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economic reasons such food cannot flow to those who are hungry, 
and once again the social institutions thwart what could be a just dis-
tribution of the produce of an Earth commons. As a result of these 
social barriers, the environment will be further degraded by starving 
peoples, and the downward spiral continues. 
The one Earth has no one government. Since sovereign nations are 
unwilling to cede any sovereignty to a world government, commons 
issues have to be negotiated in a political system where nations are 
defending the rights of their citizens, but the fragmented system pre-
vents an integrated, global solution. In pollution cases, for example, 
the polluted nation, downwind or downstream, does not have any 
control over the polluter, upwind or upstream, while the polluter 
does not have any incentive to curb its pollution, since the damages 
are external to the nation. Cooperative action is difficult where there 
is little opportunity to regulate and police. 
Keeping each nation oriented to global perspectives is a major role 
of the United Nations. Since the United Nations is not a sovereign 
state, its appeal must be largely persuasive, negotiatory, ethical— 
based on rights and responsibilities, more than on military force or 
political power. There are about 125 international agreements that 
deal directly with environmental problems. The United Nations 
Environment Programme played an important role in negotiations 
leading to the 1987 Montreal ozone protocol. The U.N. International 
Law Commission has been studying international liability and interna-
tional watercourses, affecting environmental issues. The Third U.N. 
Conference on the Law of the Sea was significant. But national sover-
eignties have often tended to constrain the effectiveness of the United 
Nations as an advocate of the global commons. If the controlling inter-
est is national sovereignty and welfare alone, we may be prevented 
from an Earth ethics by the fallacy of misplaced community. National 
sovereignties divide us when we need deeper solutions, respecting 
the larger communities of life on Earth. 
Here the university community is—or can be and ought to be— 
transnational, international, global. Ideas need not stop at national 
boundaries; ideas can be exchanged freely when other resources can-
not. Ideas are not consumed when used; they are not divided when 
shared. Ideas can sometimes fragment community, but the test of the 
best ideas is how they unify community. And the ideas we need are 
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visions and convictions of a global community that both is and ought 
to be—one world environmentally where there ought increasingly to 
be international community. Laws may stop at national boundary 
lines, but morality does not. Laws that cross national boundary 
lines can seldom be enforced on an unwilling nation; if there is to be 
compliance, moral persuasion is as important as political force. 
This is a global vision; it requires resolving many questions about 
the entanglement of natural resources with national interests. Who 
has access to genetic resources and technology transfer? Who has a 
right to what, when valuable natural resources are exploited to make 
a profit? When resources are taken to be national possessions in dis-
pute, it is difficult to find a fabric in which to share them. National 
rights obscure global responsibilities. 
The Earth is one; its cultures are myriad. In a way, that is welcome; 
diversity is part of the richness of Earth. Cultural diversity is a good 
thing, just as natural diversity is a good thing. Many environmental 
problems are regional and do not need global solutions. But not 
always, and not in some critical eases. Diversity can be divisive. The 
myriads of cultures do not make it easy to reach common accord, 
even when such cultures have a common interest in maintaining the 
natural systems that support these cultures. Our national loyalties and 
cultural identities can assist in this, but they can just as often get in the 
way. The essential problem is that power is decentralized into national 
and subnational units—political units that may have little or no intelli-
gent relationship to geography and ecology—while solutions are 
needed that integrate into systemic, global levels on a whole Earth. 
The operative values are fragmented, political, economic; the needed 
values are global, ethical, and ecological. 
The view from space gives us that vision. It eliminates boundaries; 
Earth is a seamless dynamic whole. Two Arab astronauts sensed this 
expanding perception: "The first day we all pointed to our countries. 
The third or fourth day we were pointing to our continents. By the 
fifth day we were aware of only one Earth."24 "From space I saw 
Earth—indescribably beautiful with the scars of national boundaries 
gone."25 But that view from space has yet to be made operational 
when we come back down to Earth and defend our personal or 
national interests oblivious to our global responsibilities. 
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CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE IN EARTH COMMUNITY 
Once the mark of an educated person could be summed up as civitas, 
citizenship. People ought to be good citizens, productive in their 
communities, leaders in business, the professions, government, 
church, education. That was what the universities tried to produce: 
educated citizens. But the mark of an educated person is today, 
increasingly, something more. It is not enough to be a good "citizen," 
it is not enough even to be "international," because neither of those 
terms have enough "nature," enough "earthiness" in them. "Citizen" is 
only half the truth; the other half is that we are "residents" on land-
scapes. We are earthlings. Earth is our dwelling place. From here 
onward, there is no such thing as civic competence without ecologi-
cal competence. 
As Andrew Brennan notes (this volume), the graduates of universi-
ties in today's world are as likely to be part of the problem as part of 
the solution. Indeed, most of those leaders of government, com-
merce, and industry who urge unwise development, and who jeopar-
dize our environment, have degrees after their names, sometimes a 
string of them. Substantial academic credentials do little to guarantee 
that a person maintains a sustainable relationship with the planet, 
much less an appropriate respect for nature. Often as not, the number 
of degrees is in inverse proportion to the degree of sustainability 
achieved. Many a citizen who is celebrated for his or her humanity is 
quite illiterate when it comes to reading the signs of the times boding 
ecological crisis. University graduates may know their duties to fellow 
citizens. But they are often, tragically enough, persons without a 
sense of responsibility to their native landscapes. They do not yet 
have a land ethic, an earth ethic. 
Our responsibility to Earth might be thought the most remote of 
our responsibilities. It seems so grandiose and vague beside our con-
crete responsibilities to our children or next-door neighbors. But not 
so! Indeed, the other way around. It is the most fundamental of our 
responsibilities. Responsibilities increase proportionately to the level 
and value of the reality in jeopardy. We have already said that ecosys-
tems are as real as species, as real as individual plant and animal organ-
isms, as real as cells, or molecules, or atoms, because any level is real if 
it shapes the structure and behavior of its component parts. Moving 
up the scale of being to the global level, the highest level that we 
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humans have power to affect—the Earth—is the most real phenome-
non of all, marvelously real. We can hardly be responsible to anything 
more cosmic—unless perhaps to God, if God exists. 
Real community does not yet exist at world levels; nevertheless 
humans live on only one Earth and our powers operate at global 
ranges. An opportunity that we face from here onward, indeed a 
necessity thrust upon us, is to see Earth globally, to see ourselves as 
Earth residents with transnational interests. From the perspective of a 
nation-state, when we hear the word 'international,' we think at once 
of domestic and foreign. But with the word 'global,' there is no domes-
tic and foreign, we are all natives. At that level, we are not citizens of a 
nation but residents. The animal who builds a polis still inhabits an 
oikos, a whole world. Humans have an ecology. We are incarnate in 
earth. We are Earth incarnate. 
The natural and the cultural on Earth have entwined destinies. 
Across great reaches of geological time, there were no humans on 
Earth. Earth was entirely a natural system. Earth remains a vast natural 
system, as we see at once with the views from space. But for several 
thousand years Earth has increasingly supported cultural systems, 
and, in the last few centuries, these cultural systems have exploded. 
The great universities of the world have fueled that explosion. Today, 
everywhere, the resulting explosion of culture presses Earth's natural 
systems to their carrying capacities. In such situations, the myriad 
sovereign states can, as we have lamented already, make it difficult to 
cooperate. 
But there is another side to the story. Just the threat to natural sys-
tems at the planetary level can produce consensus because now 
nations have a common interest that is entwined with the integrity of 
natural systems on the planet. The rights we claim have to be inte-
grated with our responsibilities at the planetary level. The universities 
share the challenge of making that vision operational. The persons 
during whose lifetime the fate of the Earth will largely be decided are 
the generation of students in our universities today. 
EARTH ETHICS 
We are concluding that, beyond ecosystems, there is one level more, 
the global level. Environmental ethics is not over until we have an 
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Earth ethic. Future generations, animals, plants, species, ecosystems 
are progressively less familiar ethical territory, and an ethic for Earth 
itself may seem the oddest of all. Since everyone wishes a healthy 
environment, perhaps ethics can simply stay at our first focus: 
humans. A healthy global environment is requisite for healthy 
humans; this is their right. We are concerned with human well-being 
immediately and with environmental health instrumentally to that. 
But can we really say that the only value displayed in the panorama 
of life—animals, organism, species, ecosystems—is that which is 
instrumental to human welfare? Ought not this sole moral species do 
something less self-interested than count all the produce of an evolu-
tionary ecosystem as nothing but human resources? Such a provincial 
attitude hardly seems biologically informed, much less ethically ade-
quate. It hardly seems the universal view that a university ought to 
advocate. To the contrary at this point, four hundred years after the 
Enlightenment that launched modern universities, we find that moral 
enlightenment still lies ahead. 
We need an ethical vision where other things count that are outside 
the human circle. Perhaps humans should find a place in an encircling 
Earth? We may not want to say that animals, plants, species, ecosys-
tems, or Earth have rights, but neither do we think humans have a 
right wantonly to destroy these valuable things. In an ethic of respect 
for life, the appropriate level of moral concern is the appropriate sur-
vival unit. The planet is that ultimate survival unit. Now we are begin-
ning to get a change of reference frame. No longer does it seem that 
humans count alone, with everything tributary to them; humans 
count as residents on this majestic planet. 
An earth ethics suggests an ethics about dirt. That is sometimes 
taken to be the ultimate reductio ad absurdum in environmental 
ethics: One would have to be an ultimately confused academic to 
maintain that we can have duties to dirt. A university professor who 
so maintains is not part of the solution but irrelevant to the problem. 
Put like that, I suppose, we have to agree. Dirt, earth (spelled with the 
lower case "e") has no intrinsic value nor do we have duties to it. Yet 
there is more to say, another logic that has different kinds of implica-
tion. This logic knows the implications, the unfoldings and the infold-
ings, of the logic of earth. For the biological implications of 
earth—and of Earth—are profound. 
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When we go from earth to Earth, from dirt to the prolific planetary 
system of which it is part, perspectives change. Dealing with an acre 
or two of real estate, perhaps even with hundreds or thousands of 
acres, we can think that it belongs to us and that its only value is 
instrumental to our preferences. Dealing with a nation-state, we think 
citizens should defend their territory and their goods. But on the 
global scale, Earth is not something we own. Earth docs not belong to 
us; rather we belong to it. We belong on it. The question is not of 
property but of propriety. The vision of human life we ought to seek is 
not that of maximum exploitation of Earth as a big property resource, 
not the defense of our territory; it is that of valued residence in a com-
munity of life. 
In that sense, an Earth ethic is not the reductio ad absurdum of 
silly and peripheral concern about chipmunks and daisies, extrapo-
lated to rocks and dirt. To the contrary, it is the elevation to ultimacy 
of an urgent world vision. It is the ultimate implication, the logical 
consequence of being alive on Earth. Perhaps there is a God above, 
and this marvelous living Earth may witness to that God, but mean-
while what cannot be doubted is that on this enthralling Earth we live 
and move and have our being. A century ago, a call for community 
was typically phrased as "the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood 
of God." Now, turning the millennium, for the twenty-first century 
such a call must be more ecological—and less patriarchal—a call for 
appropriate respect for this mother Earth, this womb out of which we 
come and which we never really leave. Such an ethic is not one more 
item to be added to an already long university agenda. On this home 
planet in crisis, it is the agenda. From here forward, a university edu-
cation that is not environmental education is no education at all. 
Summing up the prospects for a land ethic, Aldo Leopold lamented: 
Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a 
land ethic is the fact that our educational and economic system is 
headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness 
of land. Your true modern is separated from the land. ... He has 
no vital relation to it; to him it is the space between cities on 
which crops grow. ... In short, land is something he has "out-
grown" . . . Much higher education seems deliberately to avoid 
ecological concepts. An understanding of ecology does not nec-
essarily originate in courses bearing ecological labels; it is quite 
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as likely to be labeled geography, botany, history, or economics. 
That is as it should be, but whatever the label, ecological training 
is scarce. The case for a land ethic would appear hopeless but for 
the minority which is in obvious revolt against these "modem" 
trends. 
The key-log which much be moved to release the evolutionary 
process for an ethic is simply this: ... Examine each question in 
terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is 
economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to pre-
serve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community, 
It is wrong when it tends otherwise.26 
In the half century since Leopold wrote, we have learned that the 
land ethic, in the end, has to be an earth ethic. But our universities 
have still to get education headed in the right direction. 
CONCLUSION 
It was feared by some that the space flights, reaching for the stars, was 
an act of human arrogance—hubris in extreme—more of the con-
quest and dominion that have already ravaged the planet. And such 
knowledge-become-power epitomized the know-how flowing out of 
our proud universities. But the haughty, the high, and the mighty 
failed to materialize with the flight into space. Rather humility—from 
humus, meaning "earthy" (which is also the root of 'human')—was 
the dominant experience. Perhaps that is the truth in the beatitude: 
"Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the Earth." The challenge 
to the university, after the knowledge and power it imparts from one 
generation to the next, is to educate this generation and the next into 
that meekness that can inherit the Earth. For Earth is indeed a planet 
with promise, a promised planet, and we humans have both the right 
to share in and the responsibility to help to keep that promise. 
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